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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE INDIANA MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ACT: RE-EVALUATED
In the early 1970's insurance companies declared a nationwide
"medical malpractice crisis."' Insurance carriers feared that excess jury
verdicts would result in extensive losses due to the insurance
industry's inability to anticipate future awards.! As a result, insurance
carriers refused to guarantee future insurance coverage to all health
care providers.3 The Indiana Legislature responded to this "crisis"
by enacting the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act.4
Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act was designed to guarantee that
health care providers would continue to receive malpractice insurance
coverage.5 In order to accomplish this guarantee, the Legislature
enacted several limiting provisions. A monetary limitation on the
amount of damages of $500,000 per incident' and a reduction in the
1. The "medical malpractice crisis" was not brought about by medical prac-
tice but by malpractice insurance carriers. See generally L. LANDER, DEFECTIVE
MEDICINE: RISK, ANGER, AND THE MALPRACTICE CRISIS (1978).
2. Questions have been raised as to the validity of the "fears" of the insurance
industry. In 1974, the average pay out per doctor was $750, while the average premium
paid per doctor was $3,500. Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The Alleged "Crisis" in Perspec-
tive, 637 INS. L. J. 90, 97 (February, 1976). See also Note, Alternatives To Litigation:
Pretrial Screening and Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims: Has Missouri Taken
a Giant Step Backward? 50 UMKC L. REv. 182 (1982).
3. Insurance companies argued that the increased cost of providing health
care services, the increase in the number of claims and suits against health care pro-
viders, and the unusual size of such claims were forcing them to withdraw from the
insuring the high risk health care providers. Hoodenpyl, Medical Malpractice Litiga-
tion in Indiana, 20 RES. GESTAE 126, 127 (March 1976).
4. Medical Malpractice Act of 1975, IND. CODE S 16-9.5 et seq (1976).
5. Indiana's Legislature failed to state a purpose for the Medical Malprac-
tice Act, however, the Indiana courts have explained the purpose of the legislation.
See, e.g., Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, Ind. - - 413 N.E.2d 891, 894 (1980) (the
legislature enacted this legislation to prevent the loss of insurance to health care pro-
viders); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Ind. -. .. 404 N.E.2d 585, 590 (1980)
(the limitations of the Act were written to allow health care insurance carriers to
better anticipate their expenses and to guarantee insurance to all health care providers).
6. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-2-2 (1982).
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age of disability for minors to age six7 are the harshest of the limita-
tions placed on the health care tort victim. Moreover, the legislature
defined a statute of limitations for the filing of claims to begin two
years from the date of "occurrence" instead of the date of "discovery."8
In addition to these limitations, the Legislature created a review panel
to screen malpractice claims.' The purpose of the review panel process
is to expedite the review of malpractice claims which ordinarily pro-
ceed to trial, as well as screen out non-meritorious claims." As a result
of these provisions, the Legislature hoped to increase the delivery
of health care services and decrease the costs of medical care."
This note discusses the constitutional implications of the Indiana
Medical Malpractice Act. Limitations on the amount of damages
available to an injured patient, the age of disability for minors, and
the two years from "occurrence" statute of limitations have resulted
in classifications which violate the patient's equal protection rights
as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.'2 Admissibility of the
review panel's decision in a future court action denies the patient his
right to trial by jury. 3 Actual application of the review panel process
has resulted in oppressive delays contrary to the intent of the
Legislature.'4 These delays are a violation of both the patient's right
to trial by jury and the patient's right of access to the courts." Con-
stitutional implications of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act make
it an invalid method of dealing with the "medical malpractice crisis."
7. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-3-1 (1982). Prior to the Medical Malpractice Act the age
of disability for minors was eighteen.
8. Id.
9. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3 (1982).
10. The rational behind legislative provisions establishing review panels or
arbitration panels was to screen out unmeritorious claims and to encourage parties
to settle valid claims, thereby, expediting the review of malpractice claims. See supra
note 2 at 185.
11. Sakayan, Arbitration and Screeing Panels: Recent Experiences and Trends,
17 FORUM 682, 683 (1982).
12. See infra notes 123-39 and accompanying text. The two-year statute of
limitations is beyond the scope of this Note. Indiana courts have questioned the con-
stitutionality of this limitation. "We have not though, ruled out the possibility of deciding
in a future case that this occurrence rule must be applied as though it was a discovery
rule due to the questionable constitutionality of the occurrence rule." Alwood v. Davis,
__ Ind. App. , - 411 N.E.2d 759, 761 (1980). See also Chaffin v. Nicosia, 261
Ind. 698, 310 N.E.2d 867 (1974).
13. See infra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
14. See supra note 5.
15. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
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THE INDIANA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT
Patients' claims against health care providers" were originally
governed by the same statutes governing other tortfeasors.'7 The
statute of limitations for filing a malpractice complaint was two years
from the date the "cause of action accrued." 8 This statute of limita-
tion was construed to run from the date the injury resulted and
damages were ascertainable." A malpractice plaintiff would file his
complaint in a court of law and had the right to demand a jury trial.'
An injured patient could recover, without limitation, any amount of
damages which the jury awarded and the court found to be
reasonable.2 However, in 1975 the Indiana legislature enacted the
Indiana Medical Malpractice Act which separated "medical malprac-
tice" tort feasors from all other tortfeasors. In order to understand
the implications of separately classifying the "medical malpractice"
tortfeasor, one has to be familiar with the procedures involved.
A. Procedure under the Malpractice Act
A health care provider qualifies for protection under the Indiana
Medical Malpractice Act by meeting the minimal prerequisites of the
Act.' First, the health care provider is required to file proof of finan-
cial responsibility" with the Indiana Commissioner of Insurance."
Secondly, the health care provider must pay an annual surcharge"
within thirty days after the premium for malpractice insurance
16. The term "health care provider" includes a person, partner, corporation,
registered or licensed nurse, officer or employee, college, university, blood bank and
mental health center. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-1-1 (a)(1)(2)(3) (1982).
17. IND. CODE S 34-4-19-1 (1982).
18. IND. CODE S 34-1-2-2 (1982).
19. Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 679, 161 N.E. 251, 259 (1928).
20. Id.; see also IND. CODE S 34-1-54-8 (1971).
21. IND. CODE S 34-1-22-1 (1982).
22. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-2-1 (1982).
23. Proof of financial responsibility requires that the health care provider's
insurance carrier file proof of the health care provider's policy of malpractice liability
insurance. Each health care provider is required to have liability insurance of at least
$100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 in annual aggregate insurance. A hospital with
100 or fewer beds is required to keep an annual aggregate policy of $2,000,000, while
a hospital with over 100 beds is required to have a minimum of $3,000,000 in annual
aggregate liability insurance. See IND. CODE S 16-9.5-2-6 (a)(1) (1982).
24. A health care provider may also qualify his officers, agents and/or
employees for malpractice insurance. In order to qualify they must be named individually
or by class in the statement of proof of financial responsibility. Such insurance covers
only malpractice within the scope of employment See IND. CODE S 16-9.5-2-1(b) (1982).
25. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-4-1(bX1982). The annual surcharge is determined by the
Commissioner of Insurance based upon actuarial principles.
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coverage is received by the health care provider's insurer.'8 Failure
to pay the surcharge within the time limit results in the suspension
of the Act's protection until payment is made." If a health care pro-
vider fails to meet the prerequisites of the Malpractice Act, a malprac-
tice victim will not be restricted by the terms of the Act. 8
The patient of a health care provider that has qualified under
the Malpractice Act is similarly required to follow the requirements
of the Act to initiate a claim. The injured patient must file a com-
plaint with the Commissioner of Insurance" within two years of the
alleged act, omission, or neglect of the health care provider.3 If the
patient is under, six years of age at the time of the alleged malprac-
tice, he has until his eighth birthday to file a claim.3 ' After filing the
complaint, the patient and the health care provider must wait at least
twenty days, at which time either party may file a request for the
formation of a medical review panel.2 After the complaint is heard
by the medical review panel,' the patient has ninety days to refile
the complaint with a state court. 4
The medical review panel consists of one attorney and three
health care providers.2 5 Time constraints are set for the selection of
the panel members to expedite the selection process. The attorney
member sits in an advisory capacity, as chairman, and has no vote
26. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-4-1(d)(1982).
27. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-4-1(g)(1982).
28. If a health care provider does not qualify under the Act, the patient's
right of action would be governed by the same statutes as other tort claimants' actions.
Thus there is no cap on recovery. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-1-5 (1982).
29. IND. CODE §16-9.5-9-1 (1982). In addition, the statute provides, "no dollar
amount or figure shall be included in the demand in any malpractice complaint, but
the prayer shall be for such damages as are reasonable in the premises." IND. CODE
5 16-9.5-1-6 (1982).
30. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-3-1 (1982). Indiana courts interpret this statute of limita-
tions to be based on an "occurrence" rule rather than a "discovery" rule. Therefore,
if the patient fails to discover the malpractice within two years of the day of the
physicians conduct, the patients cause of action is lost. See Colbert v. Waitt, - Ind.
App. - - 445 N.E. 2d 1000, 1002 (1982). The only exception to the statute of
limitations is the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. To invoke this doctrine the health
care provider must have defrauded the patient in such a manner as to mislead the
patient or elude the investigation of the patient who claims the cause of action. Id.
at 1003.
31. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-3-1 (1982).
32. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-1 (1982).
33. Before any action can be commenced in state court, the plaintiffs com-
plaint must be heard by a review panel. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-2 (1982).
34. As the statute is written, a defendant cannot file a complaint in a state
court. The statute only provides for a filing by the plaintiff. Id. See also IND. CODE
5 16-9.5-5-6 ((1976).
35. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3 (1982).
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in the panel's decision.' The parties must agree upon a chairman
within fifteen days after the request for formation of the panel. 7 If
the parties fail to agree on a chairman the Clerk of the Supreme Court
will draw at random a list of five qualified attorneys.' After a chair-
man is selected, the Clerk of the Supreme Court has five days to
inform the chairman of the selection. 9 Within fifteen days after
notification, the chairman must inform the Clerk of his acceptance
or make a showing of good cause as to his inability to serve."' Once
the chairman is confirmed, each party has fifteen days to choose a
health care provider to sit on the panel.4 '1 The third health care pro-
vider is selected by the first two health care providers" within fif-
teen days of their selection. 3 After all the members are selected, the
chairman must notify the Commissioner of Insurance within five days."
Therefore, the selection process encompasses seventy to ninety days
from the request for a formation.
4 5
36. It is the chairman's duty to expedite the selection of the panel members,
convene the panel, and the panel's decision. The chairman may also schedule reasonable
dates for submission of evidence. Id.
37. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3(a)(1976).
38. Once the clerk of the Supreme Court has compiled a list of five attorneys,
both parties alternatively strike names until only one name remains. If a party fails
to strike a name within five days, the opposing party must request the Clerk of the
Indiana Supreme Court to strike for them. Id.
39. Id.
40. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3(a)(2)(1982). The requirements for showing "good cause"
are found in subsection (c).
41. If a party is unable to select a health care provider in the prescribed
time limit the chairman will choose someone and notify both parties. IND. CODE
16-9.5-9-3(b)(1)(1982).
42. Id.
43. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3(b)(2)(1982). If the two panel members fail to choose the
third health care provider within 15 days, he will be chosen by the chairman. Id. Either
party can challenge the selection of any panel member within ten days of his selection
without cause. The party whose member was challenged shall select a replacement.
If the challenge involved the third health care provider, the first two health care pro-
viders make another selection. If two such challenges are made the chairman shall
choose three members and each side shall strike one, the remaining one will take
that position. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3(b)(3)(1982).
44. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3(b)(4)(1982).
45. Addition of the minimum number of days under each subsection of sec-
tion 3 results in 70 days:
Number of days Subsection
15 (a)
5 (a)
15 (a)
15 (b)(2)
15 (b)(2)
5 (b)(4)
Total 70 days
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The medical review panel's sole duty is to determine the validity
of the patient's complaint against the defendant health care provider."
Each party may submit evidence to the review panel, including:
medical charts, depositions of witnesses, x-rays, lab reports, and
excerpts from treatises.47 All evidence must be submitted by the
parties in written form.48 Panel members will review the submitted
evidence and may also request additional information, consult with
medical authorities, and examine reports prepared by other health
care providers.49 After submission of the evidence, either party may
convene the panel and ask questions concerning any relevant issues
before the panel.' The panel has thirty days in which to render an
opinion after receiving all of the information and meeting with the
parties." The panel has a maximum of 180 days from the date of the
selection of the last member to render its expert opinion.' Therefore,
the entire panel process should take a maximum of nine months from
the date the complaint is filed to the date the decision is rendered."
A determination by the panel that the defendant's care fell below
the community standard of care is followed by the patient's claim for
An additional 20 days can be added to the selection process if lack of agreement bet-
ween parties causes the clerk of the supreme court to strike names or the chairman
to choose names of qualified members. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3 (1982).
46. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-7 (1982).
47. IND. CODE 5 16-9.5-9-4 (1982).
48. Id.
49. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-6 (1982).
50. The chairman is the presiding member of the informal meetings of the
review board. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-5 (1982).
51. One or more of the following expert opinions must be rendered by the
panel:
(a) The evidence supports the conclusion that defendant or defen-
dants failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care as charged
in the complaint.
(b) The evidence does not support the conclusion that the defen-
dant or defendants failed to meet the applicable standard of care as charged
in the complaint.
(c) That there is a material issues of fact, not requiring expert
opinion, bearing on liability for consideration by the court or jury.
(d) The conduct complained of was or was not a factor of the
resultant damages. If so, whether the plaintiff suffered: (1) any disability
and the extent and duration of the disability, and (2) any permanent im-
pairment and the percentage of the impairment.
IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-7 (1982).
52. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3.5 (1982).
53. The total of 270 days or nine months for the panel process includes a
maximum of 90 days for the panel selection and 180 days for the panel to render
its decision.
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damages. If the claim is in excess of one hundred thousand dollars
($100,000.00), the plaintiff must file a petition in the court named
in the proposed complaint.' The petition will either seek approval
of an agreed settlement, 56 or demand payment of damages from the
patient's compensation fund." After the petition is filed, the Commis-
sioner and either the health care provider or his insurer may agree
to settle with the claimant from the compensation fund or file written
objections to the payment of the amount demanded. 8 The judge of
the court then sets a court date for the approval of the petition59 or
a hearing if objections were filed by the health care provider. ®
A hearing will result in a decision by the court of the amount
of the plaintiffs damages. Relevant evidence may be submitted by
the Commissioner of Insurance, the claimant, the health care provider,
and the health care provider's insurer." After hearing the relevant
evidence, the court decides what damages, if any, will be paid by the
health care provider and the patient's compensation fund.8
The maximum award the patient can recover from the health
care provider and the patient's compensation fund is $500,000.00. The
first $100,000.00 of the court's judgment or approved settlement is
paid by the health care provider's insurance.' Judgments or set-
tlements in excess of $100,000.00 are paid from the patient's compen-
sation fund up to the Act's $500,000.00 limitation. 4 To receive pay-
ment, the patient's attorney must report the judgment or approved
settlement to the Commissioner of Insurance within sixty days of the
54. A maximum amount of up to $100,000 in damages is paid by the health
care provider or his insurer. Therefore, damage settlements below $100,000 do not
require review by the Commissioner of Insurance. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-4-3 (1982).
55. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-4-3(1) (1982). A Petition can be filed, in any case, in the
circuit or superior courts of Marion County. Id.
56. Settlement of the claim at any time during the proceedings is encouraged,
the only requirement is that the settlement be approved by the court. Id. S 16-9.5-4-2.
57. Id.
58. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-4-2 (1982).
59. Any settlement approved by the court cannot be appealed. IND. CODE S
16-9.5-4-3(6) (1982).
60. IND. CODE S 16-9.54-3(4) (1982).
61. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-4-3(5) (1982).
62. Any amount awarded in excess of the insurer's liability of $100,000 is as-
sessed against the patient' scompensation fund. Id.
63. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-2-2(d) (1982).
64. A balance of $400,000 is the total portion assessable against the patient's
compensation fund. This figure equals the $500,000 cap on recoveries less the amount
of $100,000 assessable to the health care provider or his insurer. IND. CODE
S 16-9.5-2-2(c) (1982).
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final disposition. 5 All claims received by the Commissioner will be
computed as of the last day of the year of the decision." If the full
payment of all claims would exhaust the patient's compensation fund,
the fund will be prorated over the number of unpaid judgments and
the balance paid in the following year. 7
A patient has ninety days after the panel's decision to file a com-
plaint in a court of law demanding trial by jury.68 The complaint can-
not include a demand for specific damages, but can include a prayer
for "reasonable damages." 9 At trial the panel's decision is admissible
as evidence" and, in addition, either party may call any member of
the panel as a witness.7' The jury may award an appropriate amount
of damages up to the $500,000.00 limitation." The jury's decision is
appealable by either party.73
Indiana Medical Malpractice legislation was drafted to expedite
the reviewing of malpractice claims. 4 All of the steps of the review
process are to be completed within prescribed time limits. If one party
fails to meet a time limit in the panel selection process, the other
party may have the Clerk of the Supreme Court expedite the selec-
tion. However, the legislature has failed to provide a remedy if the
panel members or non-party participants do not follow the prescribed
time limits. Lack of a remedy for failure to meet prescribed time
limitations has resulted in delays in the panel process and, therefore,
65. The statute provides that the report to the commissioner must state: "(a)
nature of the claim; (b) damages asserted and alleged injury; (c) attorney's fees and
expenses incurred in connection with the claim or defense; and (d) the amount of any
settlement or judgment." IND. CODE S 16-9.5-6-1 (1982).
66. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-4-1(j) (1982).
67. Id.
68. A decision by a medical review panel is a prerequisite to filing a com-
plaint in state courts. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-1-6 (1982).
69. Id. After a panel decision, the complaint must be filed in a court of law
having requisite jurisdiction.
70. IND. CODE 5 16-9.5-9-4 (1982).
71. Id.
72. IND. CODE 5 16-9.5-2-2 (1982).
73. IND. CODE 5 16-9.5-4-3 (1982). Appeal of a state court decision can be made
by either and is governed by the Indiana Rules of Civil Procedure. IND. CODE S 34-1-47-1
(1982).
74. See supra notes 5, 10 and accompanying text.
75. The statute provides that "a party, attorney or panelist who fails to act
as required by this chapter without good cause shown is subject to mandate or
appropriate sanctions upon application to the court designated in the proposed com-
plaint as having jurisdiction." IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3.5 (1982). However, this has not been
proven to be an adequate remedy for keeping the panel process within the prescribed
time limitations. See infra notes 76-90 and accompanying text.
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few claims receive a review panel decision within the nine month
prescribed limitation.
B. Statistical Analysis of the Operation of the Act
Following the legislative procedures, a review panel decision
should be rendered within nine months of a request for a panel
formation.76 However, this nine-month legislative scheme is rarely met
due to various delays occasioned during the process." These delays
have been exacerbated by the growing strain on the system caused
by the yearly increase in the number of complaints filed.
Complaints against health care providers have steadily increased
since the Medical Malpractice Act's inception. In 1975, only one com-
plaint was filed."8 The following year the number of complaints
increased to eighteen and in 1983 a total of 629 complaints were filed. 9
76. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
77. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
78. 1983 Ind. Dept. of Ins., Patients Compensation Division year end report
[hereinafter cited as INSURANCE REPORT].
79. STATUS OF COMPLAINTS FILED PER YEAR
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1983
YEAR
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
CUMM.
TOT.
COMPLAINTS
FILED
PER YEAR
1
18
142
272
319
401
431
556
629
2,769
COMPLAINTS
PENDING
(A)
0(.00)
0(.00)
3(.02)
11(.04)
13(.04)
34(.08)
63(.15)
131(.24)
377(.60)
632(.23)
COMPLAINTS
PROGRESS-
ING (B)
o(.oo)
2(.11)
5(.04)
13(.05)
22(.07)
56(.14)
112(.26)
230(.41)
191(.30)
PROBLEM
STATUS
(C)
0(.00)
0(.00)
4(.03)
2(.01)
9(.03)
19(.05)
16(.04)
14(.03)
18(.03)
CLOSED
(D)
1(1.0)
8(.44)
75(.53)
151(.55)
159(.50)
179(.45)
143(.33)
130(.23)
39(.06)
PANEL
OPINIONS
(E)
0(.00)
8(.44)
55(.30)
95(.35)
116(.36)
113(.28)
97(.22)
51(.09)
4(.01)
631(.23) 82(.03) 885(.32) 539(.19)
(A) (B) (C)
(A) PENDING
(B) PROGRESSING
(C) PROBLEMS
Current active cases filed
Division.
with the Patients Compensation
- Complaint has been filed, and a request for a medical review
panel has been received.
- Complaint has been filed, and a request for a review panel
has been received. The file will remain in this stage until all
the members of a panel have been selected.
Complaint has been filed, but either a dollar amount has been
referred to in the prayer, or the health care provider did not
comply with the Malpractice Act, or a possible statute of limita-
tions problem.
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Accordingly, the number of complaints awaiting panel decisions has
also increased."0
A total of 2,769 complaints have been filed with the Commissioner
of Insurance since July 1, 1975.81 Of the total number of complaints
filed, 1,345 (49 percent) are still awaiting completion. 2 Only 1,424 (51
percent) of the complaints filed have been completed, and 539 (38 per-
cent) of these completed have received panel decisions. The remain-
ing 885 (62 percent) complaints have been settled prior to the render-
ing of a panel decision.' Almost twenty-five percent of the cases filed
prior to 1981 are still awaiting a panel decision.' Thirty-six percent
of the complaints filed have been pending for a year or longer. 5 This
backlog of complaints can be attributed, in part, to the system's
inability to cope with the ever increasing need for decisions.
(D) CLOSED Complaint was filed, but it was closed prior to the rendering
of a panel opinion.
(E) PANEL OPINION- Complaint was filed and a medical review panel rendered an
opinion..
1983 Ind. Dept. of Ins., Patient Compensation Division year end report.
80. See supra note 79. Each year the number of complaints pending decision
has increased significantly.
81. Information available on the status of complaints filed prior to January
1, 1984, is as follows:
% of Total
number of
Number of complaints
complaints filed
Opinions rendered 539 19
Settled prior to opinion 885 32
"Problem status" unsettled 82 3
Review panel requested 631 23
Review panel not yet requested 632 23
TOTAL 2,769 100%
See INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 78.
82. The figure of 1345 complaints awaiting completion is computed by adding
complaints where a review panel has been requested to the number of complaints
where a review panel has yet to be requested and those considered to be in a "problem"
status. Of those complaints where a review panel has .been requested, 175 have com-
pleted the selection process and 456 are still in the selection process.
83. See INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 78; see also supra note 79.
84. By 1981, a total of 1584 cases had been filed . As of 1983, only 1200 had
been completed through settlement or panel decision. The remaining 384 (24%) had
yet to be completed. See INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 78.
85. In 1982, a total of 2,140 cases had been filed. Of these cases, 759 had
yet to be completed as of December 31, 1983. See INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 78.
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The total number of decisions rendered in any one year has failed
to equal the number of complaints pending decisions in that year."
The percentage of panel decisions was at its highest in 1983 when
it equalled twenty-seven-and-one-half percent of the complaints filed
that year.87 As of December 31, 1983, the percentage of complaints
requiring panel decisions equalled thirty-eight percent of the total
number of causes filed." If the percentage of panel decisions per com-
plaint continues to increase at the rate of three-and-one-half percent
per year,89 the backlog of complaints will continue to increase until
the year 1986. ® Efficient operation of the panel process, as envisioned
by the legislature, cannot be achieved until the number of decisions
rendered equals the caseload presented and the massive backlog is
alleviated.
Medical review panels were established to expedite the pro-
cedures involving medical malpractice complaints. Each segment of
86. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
87. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PANEL OPINIONS
MATERIAL OPINIONS
COMPLAINTS NO ISSUE RENDERED
YEAR FILED MALPRACTICE MALPRACTICE OF FACT VARIATIONS (%)
1975 1 0 0 0 0 0(.00)
1976 18 1 0 0 0 1(.05)
1977 142 1 2 0 0 3(.02)
1978 272 1 13 0 1 17(.06)
1979 319 6 33 1 0 40(.12)
1980 401 7 55 1 6 69(.17)
1981 431 16 94 4 4 118(.27)
1982 556 25 85 6 7 123(.22)
1983 629 21 133 6 13 173(.275)
1983 Ind. Dept. of Ins., Patients Compensation Division year end report.
88. The total number of cases completed as of December 31, 1983 was 1424.
Of these 1424 cases, 539 (38.5%) required the rendering of a panel decision. See supra
note 87.
89. On average, the number of panel decisions per complaint has increased
at the rate of 3.5% per year. This figure is computed by taking the percentage of
panel opinions in 1983 (27.5%) dividing by the total number of years the Act has been
in operation (8.5). See supra note 87.
90. Complaints have increased at the rate of 74 per year:
629 (complaints filed in 1983)
(divided by) 8.5 (number of years Act has been in operation)
74 (average amount of additional complaints each year)
Using this figure, as well as the increase percentage of 3.5% as constants, it is possi-
ble to estimate when the number of panel decisions will equal the number needed.
However, several assumptions must be made. First, the number of complaints needing
panel decisions will remain at 38.5 percent. Second, the number of complaints will
continue to increase at 74 per year. See supra note 90. Third, the number of decisions
50319851
Hurlbut: Constitutionality of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act:  Re-Eva
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the procedure has a prescribed time limitation. However, due to the
absence of a penalty for failure of a party to meet a deadline, the
number of complaints continue to backlog. Presently, an average of
two years is needed for a complaint to pass through the panel process
which is far in excess of the statutory nine-month guideline. Therefore,
medical review panels in Indiana have failed to expedite the review
of claims against health care providers.
THE STATUTORY LIMITATIONS OF THE INDIANA MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ACT AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act imposes three limitations
upon patients injured by health care providers. The first is a two-
year statute of limitations for filing claims.91 A second limitation is
a lowered age of disability for minors, from age eighteen to age six,
where a health care provider is the tortfeasor. 2 The third is a
$500,000.00 limitation on the amount of damages a malpractice victim
can recover.93 All three of these limitations are constraints on a
malpractice victim's equal protection rights as guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment.
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.' Courts have interpreted this
clause to mean that all those who are similarly situated must be
will continue to increase at the rate of 3.5 percent of complaints filed. The following
is a mathematical analysis of these assumptions:
% of opinions/ % short of the
Year complaint filed needed 38.5%
1984 31% 7.5
1985 34.5/o 4.0
1986 38% .5
Following the given assumptions the number of opinions rendered equal the number
of cases needing decision in 1986. Continuing this analysis one step further, the backlog
created prior to 1987 would not be completed until 1994.
91. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-3-1 (1982). The statute of limitations reads: "No claim,
whether in contract or tort, may be brought against a health care provider based
upon professional services of health care rendered or which should have been rendered
unless filed within two (2) years from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect
.. " Id. The doctrine of fraudulent concealment is the only means by which to get an ex-
tended period to file. See supra note 30.
92. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-3-1 (1982).
93. A plaintiff cannot receive in excess of $500,000 per injury or death. IND.
CODE S 16-9.5-3-1 (1976).
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1.
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similarly treated. 5 Under this interpretation, all victims of tortfeasors
are similarly situated since all tort victims have been harmed by the
action or inaction of another. 6 Victims of health care tortfeasors are
a lesser-included classification of the larger classification of tort vic-
tims. Medical malpractice claimants are dissimilarly treated since they
are the only classification regulated by the Indiana Medical Malprac-
tice Act.97
The initial question in an equal protection analysis is what stan-
dard of review is to be used. Courts traditionally use two standards
of review to determine whether a legislative classification violates the
equal protection clause. These standards of review are the "strict
scrutiny" and the "rational basis" test.9 The Supreme Court over the
last fifteen years has been searching for an intermediate standard
of review for legislation which does not easily fit under either of the
traditional standards."' 0 This search has produced a third level of
scrutiny which falls somewhere between "strict scrutiny" and "rational
basis" tests. This third approach has been referred to as a "means
scrutiny" test.101
The "strict scrutiny" standard has the most exacting
requirements. A "strict scrutiny" approach is invoked only when a
suspect classification or a fundamental right is involved.10 ' When a
court invokes the "strict scrutiny" standard, the legislature is forced
to show a great justification for the classification involved. 103 For a
95. Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 522 (1929).
96. All tort victims are harmed due to the negligent action or inaction of
another. Under the Medical Malpractice Act those victims who suffer injury due to
the negligence of a "health care provider" are treated separately from other tort victims.
97. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-1-1 (1982).
98. See Comment, Constitutional Challenges to Medical Malpractice Review Board,
46 TENN. L. REV. 203, 208 (1978-79); Taylor and Shields, The Limitation on Recovery in
Medical Negligence Cases in Virginia 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 799, 835 (1982).
99. See supra note 98.
100. See Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis:
Constitutional Implications, 55 TEx. L. REV. 759, 771-72 (1977).
101. A similar test is the "means focused" test. Both tests are an intermediate
approach to Equal Protection analysis. For a more detailed discussion on this evolving
doctrine, see Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrime on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). The reason given for the title
"Means Scrutiny" is "[a] 'substantial relationship' must be established between the
means and ends of the challenged legislation." Id. at 20.
102. In the past, suspect classifications have been based on race and national
origin. Rights that have been considered fundamental are voting, procreation, interstate
travel, and the ability to present a defense in criminal actions. Johnson v. St. Vincent
Hosp. Assn., - Ind.... - 404 N.E.2d 585, 596-97 (1980).
103. Horton v. Califano, 472 F.Supp. 339, 343 (W.D.Va. 1979).
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statute to remain valid under a "strict scrutiny" approach the
legislature is forced to prove that the statute's classification is required
by a "compelling state interest" and that no "less drastic means" are
available to accomplish the "compelling state interest."'' 4
Legislation that involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamen-
tal right"15 is reviewed under the "rational basis" test. Under the
"rational basis" approach a statute is valid as long as the legislation
is not arbitrary and is reasonably suited to achieve the legislature's
objective.'" In applying the rational basis test, the court need only
find a rational nexus between the legislative classification and a per-
missible government goal."7 The governmental goal identified by the
court need not be the goal intended by the legislature.'' Due to the
minimal level of scrutiny and the court's ability to find a permissible
governmental goal, classifications which are analyzed under the
"rational basis" test are almost always upheld.' °1
Review under a "means scrutiny" approach falls between that
of the "strict scrutiny" and "rational basis" approaches. "Means
scrutiny" analysis was first used by the United States Supreme Court
in Reed v. Reed,' when it declared an Idaho statute unconstitutional
because it gave preference to men over women as estate
administrators."' Under the "means scrutiny" test a legislative
"classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
104. See Britton v. Rogers, 631 F.2d 572, 576 (8th Cir. 1980) (governmental action
against blacks as a racially defined class is subject to "strict scrutiny"); Fullilove v.
Kreps, 584 F.2d 600, 603 (2d Cir. 1978) (public works employment does not require
"strict scrutiny" evaluation).
105. See note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection, 82 YALE
L.J. 123 (1972).
106. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The Supreme Court explained,
"A statutory discrimination will note be set aside if any statement of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it." Id. at 425-26.
107. See supra note 104, at 144; see also, e.g., Ohio Bureau of Employment Serv.
V. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977).
108. The rational basis test allows the court to find a justifiable purpose for
a particular statute. Thus an imaginative reviewing court could validate any
discriminatory legislation depending on its adherence to the theory of judicial restraint.
Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 871, 555 P.2d 399, 411 (1976).
109. "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426
(1961).
110. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
111. 404 U.S. at 77. "Regardless of their sex, persons within any one of the
enumerated classes of [administrators of estate] are similarly situated with respect
to that objective. By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus
similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause." Id.
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some ground of deference having a fair and substantial relationship
to the object of the legislation." ' The legislature must show the means
utilized are reasonable.' If the legislature fails to state a rational
objective for the means used, the court will not search for a legitimate
state purpose, and will hold that the legislative classification is
violative of the equal protection clause and, therefore,
unconstitutional.1 14
Indiana's Supreme Court has not found the classifications of the
Indiana Malpractice Act to be a violation of the equal protection
clause.1 1 5 Indiana's Supreme Court has always applied the "rational
basis" test when analyzing equal protection questions involving medical
malpractice legislation."6 "Strict scrutiny" analysis has not been applied
because the courts have never found a fundamental right to exist in
collecting damages for medical malpractice injuries, '1 1 7 nor have the
courts found a suspect class in health care tort victims."8 Due to the
court's ability to find a permissible legislative goal under the "rational
basis" approach, the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act has not been
found to be a violation of the equal protection clause.' However,
Indiana courts should reach a different conclusion if the "means
scrutiny" analysis were applied to the classifications resulting from
the limitations of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act."10
112. Id. at 76. The Idaho Supreme Court opined that Medical Malpractice legisla-
tion needs to be analyzed under a stricter standard than the traditional "rational basis"
analysis and applied the "means scrutiny" analysis in evaluating its Medical Malprac-
tice legislation. The "means scrutiny" analysis was also used by the North Dakota
Supreme Court in Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N. D. 1978) to evaluate a medical
malpractice act.
113. See supra note 101, at 21.
114. Taylor and Shields, supra note 98, at 843. The Act violates the equal pro-
tection clause if the court fails to find that the "means reasonably, fairly, and realistically
achieve the objectives of the legislation." Id.
115. See Rohrbaugh v. Wagoner, -- Ind.-, 413 N.E.2d 891 (1980); Johnson
v. St. Vincent Hosp., Ind., 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
116. Id.
117. Rohrabaugh, _nd. at - , 413 N.E.2d at 893.
118. See supra note 102. The challenged classifications under the medical
malpractice act do not fall among those listed as "suspect" by the United States Supreme
Court.
119. See supra note 114.
120. [T]hose courts striking down medical malpractice legislation on equal
protection grounds have all utilized a more exacting standard of review
than mere rationality. Although these courts have explicitly concentrated
on the factual nexus between purpose and means, an implicit evaluation
of conflicting interests also appears to play a prominent role in the judicial
decisionmaking process. The courts have balanced state goals, assuring
adequate health care and lowering malpractice insurance costs, with the
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The great significance of the right to recover for bodily injury
justifies application of the intermediate, "means scrutiny" standard.
Full compensation for tort injuries is a state-created right. 2 ' Since,
as a state-created right, the right to collect for bodily injury is not
considered a "fundamental" right the "strict scrutiny" standard can-
not be applied." However, as a state-created right, the right to collect
for bodily injury warrants application of a stricter standard than
"rational basis."'23 Therefore, the Medical Malpractice Act should be
examined under a "means scrutiny" approach.'24
Following a "means scrutiny" examination, the disability age for
minors classification of the Act is a violation of equal protection. The
Act grants children a "disability" classification until the age of six."5
If the malpractice occurred any time prior to the child's sixth birth-
day, he can file a claim until he reaches his eighth birthday. 6 The
victims of other types of tortfeasors receive a disability until they
reach age eighteen allowing them the ability to file a claim until age
twenty.' Under "means scrutiny" analysis the legislature must show
that the different treatment of minor tort victims is legitimately
related to an objective of the malpractice statute.
The aim of the Indiana Medical Malpractice statute is to keep
interests of victims of medical malpractice. In each instance, the constitu-
tional balance has favored those victims.
Note, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection
Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829, 880 (1979).
121. A plaintiff is entitled to damages for injuries proximately caused by the
breach of a duty owed to him. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., Inc., v. O'Bryan, __ Ind. App.
-... 408 N.E.2d 178, 184 (1980).
122. See supra note 102, for a list of rights the Supreme Court has considered
"fundamental."
123. Carson v. Maurer, 12 N.H. 925, 930, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980). See also
Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional
Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759 (1977)
124. See Redish, supra note 6, at 774. For a discussion of the two year statute
of limitations, see generally Carmichael v. Silbert, __ Ind. App . . 422 N.E.2d
1330, 1332 (1981).
125. See supra note 92.
126. Id.
127. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found a reduced minority classifica-
tion under the Medical Malpractice Act to be unconstitutional. "It extinguishes rights
conferred by RSA 508:8, which provides: 'An infant or mentally incompetent person
may bring a personal action within two years after such disability is removed."' (In
New Hampshire minority under the Medical Malpractice Act was eight years of age).
Carson at 933, 424 A.2d at 833.
128. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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down medical malpractice insurance costs.'" Restricting the amount
of time in which a minor can file suit is intended to enable insurance
carriers to better determine the amount of losses and thus provide
more reasonable insurance prices to health care providers.' 18 However,
studies show that the number of recoveries by minors is only a few
percent of the total number of recoveries.13 The incidental number
of additional claims that may arise under the Indiana minor's disability
statute for tort victims does not justify the harsh penalty inflicted
upon those minors, who because of their age, limited experience, and
lack of knowledge, do not learn of their injury until after the statute
of limitations has expired.'32 Therefore, the separate classification of
minors is not a "reasonable" means of keeping down medical malprac-
tice costs. Under "means scrutiny" analysis the classification does not
have a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legisla-
tion and is a violation of the victim's right of equal protection
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Similarly, the limitation on recoveries under the Indiana Medical
Malpractice Act also results in a classification which should be
analyzed under a "means scrutiny" approach of equal protection
analysis." The $500,000.00 cap on recoveries separates out a small
129. The Legislative purpose of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act is to limit
the awards to injured patients in order to appease the insurance industry and guarantee
future insurance to health care providers. See supra note 5.
130. Carson at 934, 424 A.2d at 834.
131. See C. Hoodenpyl, Medical Malpractice Litigation in Indiana - a Ten Year
Survey, 20 RES GESTAE 126, 128 (1976).
132. Carson v. Maurer, __ N.H. __, 424 A.2d 825, 834 (1980). The Indiana
Supreme Court, discussed the old minority disability, one year before the Malpractice
Act was enacted, and stated,
It makes practical sense particularly with respect to infants who, because
of their youth, cannot be expected to articulate their physical and mental
condition or to realize and act timely to preserve their legal rights. It
is not difficult to conceive of situations where the results of medical
malpractice upon an infant could remain undiscovered for a number of
years.
Chaffin V. Nicosia, - Ind., ____ 310 N.E.2d 867, 871 (1974).
133. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. The concept of due process
is not discussed as an individual topic of this Note. Arguments of due process viola-
tions can be found in the equal protection, right to jury trial, and access to court
sections, as well as in the following discussion.
The Indiana Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of Indiana's Medical
Malpractice Act in Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., __ Ind. . 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980)
including a comparison to the Price-Anderson Act. 42 U.S.C. S 2200 et. seq. (1957).
The Price-Anderson Act sets a 560 million dollar ceiling on the aggregate liability
of licensed private nuclear power companies and the government per nuclear incident.
The limit on liability is a legislative assurance given to the nuclear power industry
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group of medical malpractice victims and denies them the same
opportunities for monetary recovery possessed by all other tort
that it will not be exposed to unlimited liability in case a nuclear incident occurs.
This ceiling provision was motivated by the legislature's desire to encourage continued
research and development by the nuclear power industry.
The Price-Anderson Act's ceiling on liability includes several statutory provi-
sions. Each licensee is required to keep up to $60 million of private financial protec-
tion per incident. The United States Government is responsible for keeping an addi-
tional $500 million available for damages in excess of $60 million. Thus, the aggregate
liability, under the Act, is limited to $560 million per single nuclear incident. In addi-
tion, the Price-Anderson Act also provides that in the event that the damages from
a single nuclear incident exceeds the aggregate limitation the Congress will review
the situation and take any action necessary to protect the public from the consequences.
The reasonableness of the legislature's $560 million ceiling was later examined
under both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fifth Amendment.
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). In
Duke the Supreme Court predicated its decision on two major presumptions. The first
was the correctness of expert appraisals that the risk of a nuclear incident with damage
claims in excess of $560 million was slight. The second was that in the event of a
large scale nuclear incident Congress would likely enact extraordinary relief. Id. A
House report supported the Court's second presumption. This report asserted, "The
limitation of liability serves primarily as a device for facilitating further congressional
review of such a situation rather than a bar to further relief of the public." H.R. Rep.
No. 833, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. 6-7 (1965). The Court recognized that the individuals
that resided around nuclear power plants had a property right in receiving damages
but balanced the right against the need for nuclear power and the protection provided
by the two presumptions and found the Act was not a violation of the due process
clauses of the Fifth Amendment.
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act's ceiling does not include the presump-
tions found by the Supreme Court in the Price-Anderson Act. The malpractice fund
operates in a similar fashion as the Price-Anderson Fund. Each health care provider
is responsible for the first $100,000 in damages per incident after which the fund pays
the balance of damages up to the $500,000 ceiling. However, this is the only similarity.
The fund, itself, is not supported by any government money; instead, each health care
provider pays an annual surcharge to finance the fund. In addition, there is not a
government agency that will step in and review a patient's damages if it exceeds
$500,000. Thus, no matter what amount a patient's damages exceed the limitation,
the patient is forced to pay this excess expense on his own.
The failure of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act to provide a review for
patients whose damages exceed $500,000 prevents it from being justified by a com-
parison to the Price-Anderson Act. The Price-Anderson Act did not violate property
owners' due process rights because of the legislative commitment to take whatever
action was necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the consequences
of a nuclear disaster. A malpractice victim has a property interest in his right to
recover for bodily injury. However, a malpractice victim does not have the same
legislative commitment to take whatever action is necessary to protect him from the
consequences of a malpractice disaster. Therefore, the Indiana Malpractice Act's ceil-
ing on liability cannot override due process and equal protection challenges in light
of the Duke Power decision.
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victims." Only this group is denied the opportunity for full recovery
for expenses and pain and suffering possessed by all other victims
of tortfeasors. 13 5 The legislative purpose behind this cap was to keep
down the costs of malpractice insurance and to provide adequate com-
pensation for those with meritorious claims.'38
The cap on recoveries is not a reasonable means of meeting the
objectives of the malpractice Act. The legislature has argued that this
cap benefits all injured patients since it reduces medical costs and
guarantees the continued availability of medical care in Indiana.'37
While few claims exceed the $500,000.00 limitation, in extreme cases
the victims medical costs alone may greatly exceed $500,000.00'1 These
unfortunate malpractice victims are denied full recovery so that all
other injured patients may enjoy slightly lower medical costs. Under
"means scrutiny" analysis the $500,000.00 limitation is arbitrary and
is an unreasonable means3 9 by which to meet the objectives of the
legislation. There is no statistical information proving that the cap
134. For the purpose of this Note, malpractice victims with claims under
$500,000 are included in the group of all other tort victims.
135. A health care tort victim with expenses over $500,000 is injured twice.
He must not only suffer at the hands of the negligent doctor, but also must pay for
the cost of medical expenses in excess of $500,000. See Note, Malicious Prosecutions
and Medical Malpractice Legislation in Indiana: A Quest For Balance, 17 VAL U.L. REv.
877, 885 (1983).
136. See supra note 3.
137. Health care providers argue that the unequal treatment, of the cap on
recoveries, is necessary due to the "crisis." Thus, the legislature can set such limits
even if it denies some plaintiffs full compensation for their injuries. See, e.g., Wright
v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 318, 347 N.E2d 736, 741 (1976). However,
the burden of keeping down health care provider's insurance falls exclusively on those
unfortunate victims who need the most financial protection. See supra note 133 and
accompanying text.
138. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W2d 125, 135-36 (N. D. 1978). "[T]he very seriously
injured malpractice victim, because of the recovery limitation, might be unable to
recover even all the medical expenses he might incur, in which event he would recover
nothing for any other loss suffered." Id. at 136.
Does the "medical malpractice crisis" justify telling a malpractice victim that
he may not have full recovery of even expenses when if he had been in a "rear-end
collision of a fiery Pinto" he would have received full compensation, as well as pain
and suffering? See Note, Medical Malpractice Act: Limit on Damages for Noneconomic
Losses Held Unconstitutional, 22 ATL. L. REV. 39, 40 (1979).
139. See Note, Medical Malpractice Statute-Medical Malpractice Statute Declared
Unconstititutional, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 203, 224 (1977). The $500,000 limitation on recoveries
of the Illinois Malpractice Act is invalid on traditional equal protection grounds because
there is no reasonable basis for its distinguishing medical malpractice victims with
more than $500,000 damages from those with less than $500,000 damages. Id. See also
Wright V. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n., 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976). The
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on recoveries is a valid solution to keep down the rising costs of
malpractice insurance.14 Victims with valid claims in excess of
$500,000.00 are discriminated against in an unfair and illegitimate man-
ner and there exists, therefore, a violation of the equal protection
clause under "means scrutiny" analysis.
Classifications imposed by the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act
fail to meet the standards of the "means scrutiny" test. These
classifications are the result of statutory limitations prescribed in the
Medical Malpractice Act. Without these limitations the Act cannot
operate as the legislature intended and, therefore, they are not
severable from the Act."' Due to these classifications, the Indiana
Medical Malpractice Act is unconstitutional as a violation of the equal
protection clause.
Classifications resulting from the limitations of the Indiana
Medical Malpractice are a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
right of equal protection under the laws. Actual operation of the Act
also results in a violation of the right to trial by jury. Although the
federal constitutional right to trial by jury has not been extended
to the States, the Indiana Constitution guarantees such a right.""
PANEL DECISIONS AND THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act provides that a review
panel's decision is admissible in later court hearings.1" A plaintiff may
submit his complaint to a court of law and demand a right of trial
by jury once a panel decision is rendered.'" At a trial, the conclusion
initial legislative judgment was a prediction and with the passage of time new informa-
tion about the operation of the Act has shown that what was originally considered
a rational balance is irrational. Therefore, this original legislation should be evaluated
in light of this new information. See Bennet, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law:
Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1065 (1979).
The insurance industry requested changes in the legislation in order to guarantee
that health care providers could be provided with insurance. They argue that without
such provisions they are unable to determine what the future "payouts" will be and,
therefore, certain health care providers are too risky to insure. See supra note 5.
140. The North Dakota Supreme Court failed to find an insurance crisis and
concluded that the drastic limitation on recovery of $300,000 was a violation of Equal
Protection. See Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 136.
141. Ind. Educ. Employment Relations Bd. v. Benton Community School Corp.,
266 Ind. 491, 510, 365 N.E.2d 752, 762 (1977). Absence of a severability clause creates
the presumption that legislature intends statute to be effective in its entirety or not
at all. Id.
142. See infra note 145.
143. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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of the review panel is admissible.1 4 5 Constitutional, as well as eviden-
tiary questions 4 ' are raised by the admission of a panel decision to
the jury. Conclusions of the panel that the health care provider acted
within the appropriate standard of care effectively removes the fact-
finding process from the jury." Therefore, the result is a stripping
away of the patient's right to a trial by jury.'4
A claimant who feels that the panel's decision is improper may
elect that his cause of action be heard by a jury of his peers.'49 This
jury should be composed of members of the community who are not
health care providers.1" As such, they must rely on the testimony
of those who are more familiar with the field of medicine.' The injured
patient-plaintiff will carry the burden of showing that the defendant
was negligent in providing care."' After hearing all of the expert
testimony, the jury must determine whether the plaintiff has met his
burden."
145. See supra note 70.
146. Evidentiary issues are beyond the scope of this Note; however, the
admissibility of panel decisions is essentially a rule of evidence. For further discus-
sion see Quinn, The Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute: Maryland's Response to
the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 74, 87 (1980).
147. The jury gives great weight to the panel's decision due to the number
of experts on the panel. Therefore, the factfinding process of the jury is severely
handicapped or totally removed. See infra notes 139-60 and accompanying text.
148. Ind. Const. art. I, S 20, guarantees that every person shall have a right
to trial by jury. The right to a jury trial for personal injury (tort) was triable at com-
mon law and, therefore, is triable by a jury under the Indiana Constitution. Tompkins
v. Erie R.R. Co., 98 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 673 (1938).
149. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-1-6 (1976). A health care provider does note have the
opportunity to bring an adverse opinion to a trial court. Id.
150. A health care provider would be dismissed for cause or through peremp-
tory challenge from serving on most juries reviewing malpractice claims due to possible
prejudice. Brinkman v. Hovermale, 106 Ind. App. 70, 73, 13 N.E.2d 885, 886 (1938).
151. Due to the complexities of modern day medical technology, persons not
involved in the medical science field do not usually have the background to decipher
the technical evidence presented it.
152. The plaintiff must prove three elements to establish a prima facie case
of medical malpractice. He must first show that the physician owed him a duty. Second,
that the defendant-physician breached that duty by allowing his conduct to fall below
the community's standard of care. Thirdly, that the defendant's breach of duty caused
compensable damages to the plaintiff. Dolezal v. Goode, __ Ind. App. - , - 433
N.E.2d 828, 831 (1982). The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable if the injury is
of such a nature that it would not occur without an act of negligence. See Carpenter
v. Campbell, 149 Ind. App. 189, 194, 271 N.E.2d 163, 165 (1971).
153. See, e.g., Kranda v. Houser-Norborg Medical Corp., __ Ind. App.
419 N.E.2d 1024, reh'g. denied, 424 N.E.2d 1064 (1981).
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The admission of a negative panel finding" creates a presump-
tion of the defendant's innocence and, thus increases the plaintiffs
burden of proof. 5 5 In order to show liability on the part of the defen-
dant, the patient must prove that the physician's conduct fell below
the community standard of care." Admission of a finding by a panel
of three experts,'57 that the physician's conduct fell within the
appropriate standard of care, will necessarily carry great weight in
the jury's decision." Therefore, the plaintiff is required to prove not
only that the defendant's conduct was below the requisite standard,
but also, that the panel of experts was incorrect.
Proponents of the admissibility of the review panel findings
advance three supportive assumptions. First, the panel decision is
necessary to aid the jury's fact-finding process and help the jury
properly weigh this evidence against other evidence presented it."'
Secondly, they assume that allowing the panel decision to be admitted
into evidence will add more credibility to the review process, thereby
causing the litigants to take the process more seriously and to come
to the panel better prepared." Finally, proponents assume that a
disappointed litigant will be more amenable to settlement knowing
154. The panel can render one or more of the four required decisions. See supra
note 51 and accompanying text. A defendant is found liable by the panel if "defendant
failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care .... IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-7 (1982).
155. The plaintiff must prove the defendant's guilt by a preponderance of the
evidence. Kiger v. Arco Auto Carriers, Inc., 144 Ind. App. 239, 247, 245 N.E.2d 677,
682 (1969).
156. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
157. The three health care providers are the only voting members of the panel;
the attorney merely sits in an advisory capacity. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3 (1982).
158. In Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d
903 (1976), the Ohio Court of Common Pleas discussed the weight of arbitration deci-
sions on the jury of medical malpractice cases:
However . . . by permitting the decision of arbitrators to be introduced
into evidence, in addition to permitting the individual arbitrators to testify
effectively and substantially, reduces a party's ability to prove his case,
because the party must persuade a jury that the decision of the arbitrators
was incorrect, a task not easily accomplished in view of the added weight
which juries have traditionally accorded the testimony of experts.
Id. at 169, 355 N.E.2d at 908.
159. The Indiana Supreme Court argued that the jury will draw upon its
collective experiences and good sense to try the cause and is fully capable of giving
the panel opinion only the credibility it is justly entitled. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp.
Ass'n. -Id__ __.. 404 N.E.2d 585, 593 (1980).
160. See Alexander, State Medical Malpractice Screening Panels in Federal Diver-
sity Action, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 971 (1979).
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that the panel's finding will be admissible in court.'06 These three
assumptions must be analyzed in light of the patient's right to a trial
by an impartial jury.
Opponents of the admissibility of panel findings argue that the
benefits of the panel process and the jury's fact-finding process are
outweighed by the effects on the plaintiff's right to a jury trial."2
Opponents assert that the jury is forced to accept the review panel's
findings of liability, or lack thereof, due to the jurors lack of knowledge
in the complex field of medicine.'6 Acceptance of the panel's findings
effectively deprives the plaintiff of his right to have the jury make
an independent finding of all facts at issue.'" Therefore, the opponents
argue that the admission of the panel findings is an effective denial
of the patient's right to trial by jury.
The patient's right to trial by jury is to be kept "inviolate."''
The right of a jury trial contains two relevant elements. First, the
plaintiffs right to present his case before an impartial jury.'" Second,
is the jury's power to determine any and all issues of fact.6 7 As
admission of the panel's decision has a prejudicial effect on the jury,
the admission violates the patient's right to a full trial by jury.6 " A
jury relies heavily on the testimony of experts. 9 A decision rendered
161. Id. at 971.
162. See Lenore, Mandatory Medical Malpractice Mediation panels - A Constitu-
tional Examination, 44 INS. COUNS. J. 416, 422 (1977).
163. Prejudice on the jury of panel decisions was appropriately discussed in
Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976).
Determinations of physician negligence virtually always involve the resolu-
tion of technical and complex issues. Couched in medical terminology and
buttressed on either side by expert evidence, the burden on the petit
juror to decipher and absorb such information is substantial. Enter now
a recommendation with respect to liability of a panel composed of the
most highly respected members of the community which has predigested
the complexities and technicalities of the case .... one is inexorably led
to the conclusion that the jurors will be passively drawn to adopt this
prize panel's recommendation.
Id. at 308, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
164. Lenore, supra note 159, at 422.
165. For a detailed discussion on the effect of the $500,000 limitation on recovery
and the plaintiff's right to trial by jury, see Note, The Indiana Medical Malpractice
Act: Legislative Surgery on Patients' Rights, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 303 (1976).
166. IND. CONST. Art. I, S 20.
167. Lenore, supra note 159, at 420.
168. A parties right to a jury trial is "inviolate" means "freedom from substan-
tial impairment." Allowing the review panel decision to be heard by the jury impairs
its ability to find the facts at issue and, thus, impairs the plaintiffs right to trial by jury.
169. See supra notes 155, 160 and accompanying text.
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by three experts will necessarily be afforded greater weight than the
testimony of an individual expert. Therefore, the admission of the
review panel's decision is a violation of the patient's right to have
a jury determine any and all issues of fact.
Indiana's Constitution guarantees each individual the right to a
jury trial in civil cases. 7 ' Admissibility of a panel decision is a viola-
tion of the right to trial by jury. The right to a jury trial is also
violated by excessive delays in completing the review panel process.
RE-EVALUATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
MEDICAL REVIEW PROCESS
The Indiana legislature designed the review panel process for
the purpose of providing a short and inexpensive summary
proceeding.17' The entire process was structured to require a period
of less than nine months from the request of a panel formation.172 At
the time the legislation was drafted, there was no information available
on the operation of medical malpractice review panels,174 therefore,
the legislature could only speculate as to its actual operation. Eight-
and-one-half years have passed since enactment of the Medical
Malpractice Act, and now there is extensive information available on
the practical application of the review panel process. Thus, it is
necessary to re-evaluate the review panel process and determine
whether its actual operation denies a malpractice victim of his due
process rights.
The operation of Medical Malpractice legislation is an exercise
of the State's police power for the promotion of the health and welfare
of the public.' Courts have upheld the operation of such legislation,
170. Although the Seventh Amendment guarantee of the right to a jury trial
has not been made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, every
state but Colorado and Louisiana provides for a jury trial in civil cases in their statutes
or constitutions. Note, Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels: A Constitutional Analysis,
46 FORDHAM L. REV. 322, 328 (1977).
171. See supra notes 36-53 and accompanying text. See also Aldana v. Holub,
381 So. 2d, 231, 238 (Fla. 1980).
172. See supra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
173. As a result of the supposed "medical malpractice crisis," many states
enacted similar legislation, protecting health care tortfeasors, in 1975. Prior to 1975,
no state had enacted such legislation and no information was available on practical
operation.
174. The Indiana legislature has inherent power or "police power" to enact
laws, within constitutional limits, to promote health and general welfare. Foreman v.
State ex. rel. Dep't. of Natural Resources, 180 Ind. App. 94, 100-01, 387 N.E.2d 455,
460 (1979). However, the methods or means used by the legislature must have some
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as long as it is a proper exercise of the State's police power. 7 5 A
legislative exercise of the State's police power will not be improper
unless it operates in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner.' Under
the arbitrary and unreasonable test, Indiana courts have found the
review panel provisions to be a proper exercise of the State's police
power.'77 However, these decisions have been predicated on facts
exhibited in the legislative design and not on the statistics of actual
complaints.'78
Actual applications of the review panel process have shown that
the legislative design does not expedite medical malpractice claims
as the legislature intended. Delays in the operation of the review panel
process cause the average complaint to proceed far longer than the
statutory nine month guideline. Causes of these delays can be equally
attributed to "the Act, the plaintiffs' attorneys, defendants' attorneys,
and appointed chairmans,"'I in their attempts to comply with the panel
provisions of the Act.18° Due to the combination of causes the average
complaint takes two years to complete.' 8' Therefore, what the
legislature originally considered to be a rational means of expediting
and screening malpractice claims has resulted in lengthy delays in
processing malpractice complaints.
Florida's Supreme Court discussed the constitutionality of the
Florida Medical Mediation Act based on the results of its actual opera-
tion. Under Florida's Act, the panel is required to have a final hear-
ing on the merits within ten months from the date the claim is filed.'82
reasonable or rational relation to the purpose or ends sought. Id. at 101, 387 N.E.2d
at 461.
175. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., __Ind_ ___, 404 N.E.2d 585, 598 (1980).
176. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N. D. 1978).
177. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 5, 170 and accompanying text.
179. Warnick v. Cha, No. SD 83-163, slip op. at 5 (Cir. Ind. Nov. 2, 1983). The
reasons for the delays were discussed in Sakayan, Arbitration and Screening Panels:
Recent Experience and Trends, 17 Forum 682-89 (1982).
There are several reasons for these delays. One of the major causes is
the panel member selection process. The system has failed to attract
enough willing panelists due to inadequate compensation. In addition, some
nonpopulous states have difficulty finding specialists in the field of health
care practicing within the state. There are concomittant problems of pro-
fessional bias and friendship, failure of attorneys to complete discovery
procedures promptly and scheduling problems when all panelists are prac-
ticing professionals.
Id.. at 688.
180. Warnick, S.D. 83-163 at 5.
181. Id. at 4.
182. FLA. STAT. ANN. 786.44(3) (West Supp. 1983).
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Failure of the panel to meet the ten month limitation results in the
panel's lack of jurisdiction over the cause.1" As practical result, the
parties, through no fault of their own, are forced into court."u Effects
of the loss of jurisdiction fall heavily on the defendant who loses the
protections of the mediation panel process. In its review, the Florida
Supreme Court found that application of this strict ten month limita-
tion period is "arbitrary and capricious" and, therefore, violates the
defendant's due process rights.8 ' Florida's Supreme Court also deter-
mined that an extension of the statutory time period would be an
"effective denial of one's access to the courts." Thus, the Florida Act
was held to be unconstitutional as a result of the Act's inability to
operate as legislatively designed.
A similar medical malpractice evaluation was conducted by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In 1978, the Court declared that the
Pennsylvania Health Care Service Malpractice Act was
constitutional.8 7 Two years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
overruled its earlier decision and found that the Pennsylvania Act,
as applied, was unconstitutional.' Five years of statistical data was
reviewed by the Court in this later decision.'88 This statistical data
disclosed extensive delays which resulted from the application of the
review system."g In its analysis of the statistical information, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court concluded that "[T]he delays occasioned by
the arbitration system therein does in fact burden the right to a jury
trial.... "" Pennsylvania's Health Care Service Malpractice Act failed
to operate as prescribed and, therefore, its deficiencies were held to
constitute a violation of a patient's constitutional rights.8 2
183. "If no hearing on the merits is held within 10 months of the date the
claim is filed, the jurisdiction of the mediation panel on the subject matter shall ter-
minate, and the parties may proceed in accordance with the law." Id.
184. Aldana, 381 So.2d at 236.
185. Id. at 238.
186. Id.
187. Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
188. Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980).
189. The statistical information considered by the Supreme Court was first
presented to the Commonwealth Court. This information is included in the Supreme
Court's opinion. At that time, the act had been in existence for less than five years
and only 27 percent of the cases filed had been completed. The court also noted that
six of the original eight cases had yet to be resolved. Id. at 400, 421 A.2d at 194-195.
190. As a part of its opinion the Supreme Court included parts of the statistical
data it considered. Id. at 400, 421 A.2d at 194-195.
191. Id. at 401, 421 A.2d at 196.
192. The Pennsylvania court stated, "Such delays are unconscionable and
irreparably rip the fabric of public confidence in the efficiency and effectiveness of
our judicial system." Id. at 401, 421 A.2d at 196.
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Indiana's Supreme Court evaluated the Indiana Medical Malprac-
tice Act without reviewing the actual delays caused by its operation.
In Johnson v. St. Vincent's Hospital,"' the court found that the delays
occasioned by the medical malpractice panel process are like those
to be expected in any malpractice case."" In arriving at this conclu-
sion, the Indiana Supreme Court failed to discuss the delays that had
become inherent in the panel process.'9 5 Instead, the court relied on
the erroneous assumption that the panel process was operating within
the legislative guidelines, and, that the delays involved in the
prescribed process were not uncorxstitutional."'
Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act is burdened with the same
types of unconstitutional delays as both the Florida and Pennsylvania
Medical Malpractice Acts. The Florida Supreme Court found that an
extension of the process far in excess of ten months is a denial of
the parties' right of access to the courts.'97 An average complaint is
in the Indiana panel review process far in excess of the ten months
considered to be unconstitutional in Florida.'9 Pennsylvania's Supreme
Court felt that the fact that six cases had remained in the process
for more than four years was unconscionable, intolerable, and a denial
of the patient's right to a jury trial.'" At the end of 1983, there were
more than eighty malpractice cases still awaiting decision, that had
been pending in the Indiana review process for more than four years.'
The delays found to exist in Indiana are identical to those found to
be unconstitutional in both Florida and Pennsylvania. Thus, the Indiana
193. Ind., 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
194. The Indiana Supreme Court explained that the nine month review process
delay was like the "Delay in the commencement of a trial and the expense of
investigating and marshalling evidence are part and parcel of the preparation of any
piece of civil litigation." Johnson, Ind. at -, 404 N.E.2d at 592.
195. The Indiana Supreme Court, in deciding the Act was constitutional,
discussed only those delays involved with the actual provisions of the Medical Malprac-
tice Act. In addition, the court stated that the legislature has great deference in enact-
ing legislation involving the public health and welfare and, therefore, if such legisla-
tion is rational it is not unconstitutional. Id. at -, 404 N.E.2d at 594.
196. Id. at - , 404 N.E.2d at 591.
197. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text and charts.
198. An average complaint has been in the panel review process for 24 months.
Warnick, SD 83-163, at 3.
199. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
200. As of December 31, 1983, two cases were in the system for over 7 years.
Over 80 cases have not been closed or received a panel decision in over 4 years. These
figures do not take into consideration cases that took in excess of four years but were
completed prior to 1983 since this information is presently not available. See supra
note 79.
1985]
Hurlbut: Constitutionality of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act:  Re-Eva
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Medical Malpractice Act is unconstitutional when properly evaluated
in actual practice.
Indiana's Supreme Court must re-evaluate the Indiana Medical
Malpractice Act in light of the information available on the opera-
tional delays. An average complaint is now in the review process
approximately twenty-four months."'1 Indiana's legislature prescribed
a review system that was to be completed in nine months.' However,
complaints may pend for as long as seven years"3 without a review
panel decision. Only half of the claims filed since 1975 had been com-
pleted as of December 31, 1983."' Therefore, Indiana's Supreme Court
re-evaluation should conclude that the panel review process is a denial
of a patient's right to trial by jury and access to the court.
CONCLUSION
Limitations of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act result in
classifications which violate the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Admissibility of the panel's decision may result
in a violation of the patient's right to a trial by jury. Moreover, actual
application of the review panel process result in oppressive delays
in violation of both the patient's right to trial by jury and access to
the courts. The Indiana Supreme Court must reassess the Indiana
Medical Malpractice Act and in light of the excessive delays and con-
stitutional violations must determine that the Act is unconstitutional.
CATHERINE SCHICK HURLBUT
201. See supra note 195.
202. See supra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 79 and 197.
204. See supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
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